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Since Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations 
in 1776, economists have argued for fewer government 
restrictions on economic activities. Smith theorized 
that individuals pursuing their own interests in the 
marketplace are led —as if by an invisible hand—to 
achieve the most good for all; their profit-motivated 
behavior results in consumers getting the goods and 
services they want, produced at the lowest possible 
costs and offered to them at the lowest possible prices. 
Any government interference with this private competi-
tion is therefore almost certain to lead to inefficiencies 
and higher prices and can only be justified to enforce 
contracts or to prevent otherwise inevitable monopolis-
tic practices. Following Smith, many economists have 
argued for free trade among countries, for unrestricted 
entry into all kinds of economic pursuits, and for a very 
limited role for government. 
Yet while Adam Smith and his followers have 
made a strong theoretical case for freedom in the 
marketplace, they haven't often been able to find as 
convincing support for their case in the real world. 
Either data have simply not been available for the 
particular type of economic activity they're consider-
ing, or isolating the impact of a particular government 
restriction from the impacts of the many other influ-
ences on economic activity has been very difficult. 
The case for allowing banks the freedom to branch 
is an exception. Restricting the type of offices banks 
can open, as Montana and other largely rural states do, 
is clearly a form of government intervention that Adam 
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Smith would have questioned. It prevents willing pro-
viders of a service from selling to willing customers and 
thus, according to him, does not achieve the most good 
for all — unless, of course, it truly is preventing some 
form of noncompetitive behavior. Whether or not that 
is so can, in this case, be evaluated by more than 
Smith's theory. A considerable amount of relevant em-
pirical evidence is available: Many states have permit-
ted some form of branch banking, and their experience 
has been analyzed extensively. 
The evidence clearly supports allowing banks 
more freedom. It strongly suggests that many common 
concerns over the impact of branching on competition 
in the banking industry are unwarranted. Permitting 
branching does not drive small independent banks 
out of business or reduce the amount of credit rural 
communities can get or increase what they have to pay 
for it and other banking services. On the contrary, 
where branch banking has been allowed, large and 
small banking systems compete quite vigorously, and 
on average consumers in rural areas are offered more 
places to bank and a wider variety of banking services. 
While branching clearly changes some features of the 
banking market, it has not led to monopoly pricing, but 
rather to more banking services offered to more people 
at competitive prices. 
The evidence, in short, shows that branch banking 
has had a positive influence wherever permitted, just as 
Adam Smith would have predicted. But will it have 
similar effects in Montana? Considering the current 
structure of financial institutions and markets in this 
state, we believe that it will. 
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Banking in the United States 
Whether or not banks can branch in the United States 
has historically been a question left to each individual 
state to answer. Over the years the trend has been 
toward allowing some form of branching, but at any 
time in this century a significant number of states have 
completely prohibited it (see Chart 1). 
Today 21 states and the District of Columbia 
permit branching anywhere within their borders and 16 
states permit branching within limited areas — mostly 
within the bank's home office county and the counties 
surrounding it. This leaves 13 states that by law or 
practice still completely prohibit branching. Com-
monly referred to as unit banking states, these 13 
states have a close geographic and economic relation-
ship. All but 2 of them are located in the cluster of 
states between the Mississippi River and the Rocky 
Mountains, running from Montana, North Dakota, and 
Minnesota in the north to Texas in the south (Chart 2). 
And all of the unit banking states are largely rural and 
contain mostly small banking organizations. 
Fears about branching are unwarranted 
The opposition to branch banking in these states has 
mainly been based on fears that the ability to branch will 
reduce competition in the banking industry and so 
increase the cost and reduce the availability of banking 
services for rural consumers. Specifically, opponents fear 
that this will happen because they believe that 
1. Branch banks siphon funds out of rural areas. 
2. Branch banks are less efficient than unit banks. 
3. Large branch banks drive small unit banks out of 
business. 
4. Branching leads to increased bank concentration. 
The experience with branch banking in the United 
States has allowed researchers to test the validity of these 
concerns. Comparing states that allow branching to those 
that don't, comparing branch banks to unit banks in the 
same state, and comparing banks before and after they 
become part of a branching system has provided fertile 
ground for economic analysis. The evidence from these 
studies is quite conclusive: all four fears about branching 
are unwarranted. 
1. Branch banks do not siphon funds 
out of rural areas 
One of the most emotional issues surrounding branch-
ing is the contention that branches are established 
mainly to gather deposits from rural towns in order to 
provide loans to the head office's large corporate 
customers. Since bank credit is essential to the eco-
nomic development of rural communities, opponents 
argue, this siphoning will lead to depressed economic 
conditions in these communities. 
Proponents of branching disagree that siphoning of 
funds out of rural areas is the inevitable result of 
branch banking. They argue that a bank with branch 
offices is likely, rather, to increase the amount of funds 
available in rural communities because its loan port-
folio is more geographically dispersed and therefore 
less risky than that of a unit bank. Thus, it can hold 
Chart 1 
The Trend Toward Branch Banking 
in the United States 
Number of States Prohibiting or Allowing 
Some Form of Branch Banking in the Last 50 Years 
1978 
1929 1951 (50 states) 
Sources: White 1976, American Bankers Association 
9 Chart 2 
Thirteen states still completely prohibit branch banking. 
• No Branching • Limited Branching • Statewide Branching 
Source: American Bankers Association 
more loans per dollar of deposit than a unit bank can. 
Data explicitly revealing where bank borrowers 
are or where borrowers spend the proceeds of their 
loans are not available to settle this dispute conclu-
sively. The indirect evidence on fund flows, however, 
does not support the siphoning hypothesis. 
Studies comparing the share of funds loaned out at 
branch and unit banks suggest that, on average, branch 
banks loan more of their funds in the communities in 
which they are located. For example, Schweiger and 
McGee (1961), examining all member banks by de-
posit size in 1959, found that branch banks had higher 
loan-to-deposit ratios than unit banks in both urban 
and rural areas. And Horvitz and Shull (1964), ana-
lyzing 3,000 member banks in 1962 and 1963, found 
that branch banks had higher loan-to-asset ratios than 
unit banks located in states that either prohibited or 
allowed branching. This is not unquestionable evidence 
that branch banks loan more funds to rural communi-
ties, however. The higher ratios may simply represent 
funds siphoned to the home office's large corporate 
customers, as opponents of branching fear. 
When all home office data are excluded from the 
calculations, though, the flow of funds evidence still 
does not support the siphoning argument. Two studies 
of banking in New York State (Kohn 1964 and Kohn, 
Carlo, and Kaye 1973) concluded that on balance 
there was no significant statistical difference between 
the loan-to-deposit ratios of out-of-town branch offices 
and those of unit banks. Johnston's (1967) study of 
California banks did find a difference — in favor of 
branch banks: calculated without data from the home 
office, their loan-to-deposit ratios remained higher than 
unit banks'. Consistent with this is Kohn's (1964) find-
ing that loan portfolios of most unit banks increased 
after they became branches. 
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Opponents of branch banking also argue that branch 
banks are less efficient than unit banks. They contend 
that the extra costs inherent in overseeing a large 
branch network more than offset any advantage branch 
banks may have from centralizing certain bank opera-
tions such as personnel management, purchasing, and 
investment portfolio management. And branch banks 
probably pass some of that extra cost on to consumers 
in the form of higher prices for their services. 
Early studies supported this position. Three differ-
ent studies of bank efficiency concluded that unit 
banks were more efficient than branch banks: Alhadeff 
(1954), analyzing California banks; Schweiger and 
McGee (1961), analyzing members of the Federal 
Reserve System; and Horvitz (1963), analyzing all 
insured commercial banks. All three studies based 
their conclusion on the finding that expense-to-asset 
ratios were higher for branch banks than for unit banks 
of the same asset size. 
These studies, however, suffer from two serious 
methodological problems — problems largely created 
by lack of data—which bring their common conclusion 
into question. One problem is the assumption that bank 
output can be adequately represented by just one 
number, total assets. This assumption ignores the fact 
that banks produce many goods (various types of loan, 
deposit, and trust services, for example) and that the 
mix of goods may differ for any two banks with 
identical total assets. The other problem with these 
studies is that simply comparing branch and unit banks 
of the same size fails to recognize the added service 
that multiple locations provide customers of branch 
banks. To customers the total cost of doing banking 
business includes not only what they have to pay the 
banking office directly for their services, but also the 
time, trouble, and transportation expense involved in 
getting them. 
These methodological problems have been sub-
stantially reduced in more recent studies. Using a 
newly available body of data, researchers have con-
structed measures of costs based on a variety of bank 
services to replace the single ratio of earlier studies. 
And to account for the difference in customer conven-
ience between single-office unit banks and multiple-
office branch banks, researchers have compared a 
branch bank, not with a unit bank of the same size, but 
with a collection of unit banks of the same size as the 
branch bank's individual offices. 
Using these more extensive data, studies of the 
efficiency controversy come to quite different conclu-
sions than the earlier studies. Mullineaux (1973), 
studying commercial banking in the Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Districts, and 
Longbrake (1973), studying a wide sample of unit and 
branch banks, concluded that there were no systematic 
differences in efficiency between branch and unit 
banks. Benston (1965) and Bell and Murphy (1968) 
actually reversed the earlier results. They concluded 
that branch banks were more efficient than unit banks: 
although the costs of adding branches appeared to 
offset the savings from increased size, branch banks 
were able to provide more services in the form of a 
larger number of offices. 
3. Large branch banks do not drive small 
unit banks out of business 
Small firms of all kinds—including banks—have 
traditionally feared that a large firm with a large stock 
of capital can drive them out of business by temporar-
ily pricing its goods and services below cost. The 
hypothesis is that a large firm foregoes normal profits 
in the short run by pricing below cost with the expec-
tation that in the long run it will be able to charge 
monopoly prices and obtain above-normal profits. This 
hypothesis requires that entry costs to a market be high 
enough so that the large firm is eventually able to 
recoup its losses from the initial price cutting before 
other firms, drawn by the chance for
 44above-normal" 
profits, enter the market and compete the price back 
down. 
The banking industry, however, does not appear to 
meet this requirement. The amount of capital neces-
sary to establish a branch office is very low, so that 
large branch banks are not likely to price below cost in 
order to drive their competitors out of business; they 
simply would not be able to recoup their losses. A 
study of the effects of New York City banks branching 
for the first time in neighboring Westchester and 
Nassau Counties in 1960-64 supports this judgement. 
Kohn and Carlo (1969) found that the opening of 
branches in these counties did not significantly reduce 
the profitability of unit banks already there. Further-
more, simple observation bears this out. Unit banks 
have competed side by side with branch banks for over 
50 years in many states, including Vermont, California, 
and the Carolinas. 
Of course, it would not be realistic to assume that 
11 every unit bank would survive competition from any 
new bank, whether a branch office or another unit 
bank. The continued health of the financial system as 
well as of the economic system generally depends on 
the constant pruning of inefficient firms. 
4. Branching may increase concentration 
but not decrease competition 
Perhaps the oldest and most vocal argument against 
branch banking is that permitting it will lead to 
increased concentration, that is, to significantly fewer 
firms controlling much larger shares of the market for 
banking services. Although seldom spelled out, an in-
increase in concentration implies a decrease in compe-
tition which results in higher prices and fewer banking 
services. 
But concentration in the banking industry has 
never been well defined, so that no definite link 
between it and branching has been isolated. Even if it 
had been, though, there would still be a link missing: 
increases in the concentration of firms and the prices 
and services they offer consumers have not been 
clearly connected either by economic theory generally 
or by empirical studies of the banking industry. 
Concentration generally refers to the proportion of 
an industry's sales or assets which is made or held by 
the largest firms in the market for the industry's goods 
or services. An adequate measure of concentration, 
therefore, requires identification of both the market and 
the competitors in that market. 
The measure of concentration of banking services 
that opponents of branching typically use is the per-
centage of bank deposits in the state held by the 
largest banks. Anyone using this ratio as a measure of 
concentration obviously assumes that the state is the 
relevant market for banking services and banks are the 
competitors in that market. 
This assumption, however, is highly questionable. 
Banks offer a large number of services to a diversified 
set of consumers, and it is much more likely that there 
are a number of markets of differing geographic di-
mensions. The nation may be the relevant market for 
some services and bank customers (large business 
loans, for example). The local community may be the 
relevant market for others (like individual checking 
accounts and consumer loans). Moreover, for certain 
types of services, banks compete with many other 
financial institutions (for example, with savings and 
loan associations and credit unions for time deposits). 
Given the difficulties in defining the appropriate 
concepts behind a measure of concentration, it should 
not be surprising that the evidence on whether or not 
branching increases concentration is mixed. 
Measured by shares of deposits held by the largest 
urban banks, concentration seems to increase in states 
and in metropolitan areas when statewide branching is 
introduced. Statewide branching states currently have 
higher concentration ratios than unit banking states. In 
1978, the average ratio (based on the five largest banks 
in each area) was 73 percent in statewide branching 
states and only 37 percent in unit banking states. In the 
urban areas of these states, the corresponding ratios 
were 81 and 61 percent. In addition, over the past 25 
years, concentration ratios have decreased in unit 
banking states while they have increased in statewide 
branching states and in states that have liberalized 
their branching laws. 
When branching is introduced to rural areas, 
however, concentration seems to decrease. Ratios are 
not available based on deposits held by the largest 
banks for rural banking markets, but here the number 
of banking offices is a good proxy. Rural banks are not 
likely to branch in their own small local markets, so an 
increase in the number of offices in these areas can 
safely be assumed to represent an increase in the 
number of competing firms and thus a decrease in the 
concentration of banking services there. And that's 
what appears to happen when banks can branch. 
Horvitz and Shull (1964) found that, when other 
factors such as population density are taken into 
account, the average number of commercial bank 
offices in U.S. nonmetro areas is larger where state-
wide branching is allowed. 
Whether or not higher concentration actually 
leads to higher prices and fewer services is similarly 
ambiguous. The relationship between concentration 
and prices and services does not have a strong theo-
retical grounding. Economic theory tells us what is 
likely to happen when barriers to entry limit the market 
to one firm (monopoly) rather than many firms (perfect 
competition). The monopoly produces less than the 
competitive firms and charges a higher price. But 
theory does not say how many firms are necessary for 
competition or what the effect on competition is likely 
to be from changes in the relative size of firms in the 
market. 
The empirical evidence doesn't answer these ques-
tions either. Using the bank deposit measure again, 
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changes in concentration for a particular area and the 
price of a particular banking service. 
Edwards (1964, 1965), Flechsig (1965), Jacobs 
(1971), and Phillips (1967) studied interest rates on 
business loans, and their results were inconclusive. 
Flechsig found no statistically significant relationship 
between these interest rates and concentration, while 
the others all found a weak, positive relationship. 
Jacobs, for example, examined the determinants of 
the rates charged on loans to 8,000 customers at 160 
banks in metropolitan areas across the country. Ac-
counting for the deposits held by borrowers, the size 
and collateral of loans, and other factors, he found a 
statistically significant relationship between concentra-
tion and interest rates on business loans. But the 
impact he found was small: as large as a 10 percent 
increase in concentration yielded only a 5 basis point 
increase in interest rates. 
Studies of concentration and rates on bank deposit 
accounts reached somewhat similar conclusions. Ser-
vice charges on demand deposits and interest rates on 
time deposits were examined by Bell and Murphy 
(1968) and Edwards (1965), respectively. Again, the 
relationships to concentration were statistically signifi-
cant but quantitatively small. 
On the supposition that these studies, by focusing 
on one price, might have underestimated the impact of 
concentration in the banking industry, Heggestad and 
Mingo (1976) examined the price and availability of a 
spectrum of bank services, including interest rates on 
time deposits and new car loans, monthly charges on 
checking accounts, availability of overdraft services, 
and the total number of hours the bank was open each 
week. Their supposition seems to have been wrong. 
Where they found a statistically significant relation-
ship to concentration, they too found only a small 
quantitative impact. And that was only for about half 
the services they examined. For the other half, they 
found no significant relationship at all. 
Branching benefits consumers 
The available data thus do not support the traditional 
fears about branching: the results of nationwide studies 
let us conclude that relaxing prohibitions against 
branching will not make consumers pay more for fewer 
banking services. But as Adam Smith would, we can 
now go further: Freeing banks from restrictions on 
branching not only will not hurt consumers, it will 
actually benefit them. 
• Branching provides more banking offices 
For metropolitan areas, the evidence is clear that 
branch banking results in more offices being available 
to consumers of banking services. Table 1 shows that 
in 1974 there were about twice as many banking offi-
ces in standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) 
of statewide and limited branching states as in those of 
unit banking states. This advantage holds regardless of 
the size of the SMSA. 
The difference in the number of banking offices 
between branching and unit banking SMSAs can be 
confidently attributed to differences in bank branching 
laws. If these legal differences were not significant, we 
would expect nonbank financial firms to also have 
about twice as many offices in branching SMSAs as in 
unit banking SMSAs, but that is not true. Since the late 
1960s, federal savings and loan associations (S&Ls) 
have been permitted to branch within any state, and as 
Table 1 
The freedom to branch gives consumers 
more places to bank. 
Average Number of Financial Offices 
in U.S. Metropolitan Areas in the 1970s 
Population of Unit Limited Statewide 
Standard Metropolitan Banking Branching Branching 
Statistical Area (SMSA) States States States 
Bank Offices (1974) 
50,000-99,999  10  16  20 
100,000-499,999  24  47  54 
500,000-999,999  67  131  145 
1,000,000 and over  211  452  338 
All SMSAs  49  110  112 
Savings and Loan Offices (1970) 
All SMSAs 19 25 25 
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board 
13 Table 1 shows, there are only slightly more S&L 
offices in bank branching SMSAs than in unit banking 
SMSAs. 
That branching provides more banking offices is 
also clear for nonmetropolitan areas. As noted earlier, 
Horvitz and Shull (1964) found that when factors such 
as population density are considered, on average, 
statewide branching states have more banking offices 
per rural town than do unit banking states. They found 
this to be true for nine out of ten population sizes. 
Even stronger evidence that branching results in 
more banking offices comes from the experience in 
states which have relaxed their branching laws. One 
recent example is Minnesota, a unit banking state, 
which in 1977 permitted each bank to open two 
detached facilities within 25 miles of the bank as long 
as they were not placed in small communities already 
served by banks; in other words, small community 
banks were given home office protection. In the first 
2Vi years the new law was in effect, 137 detached 
facilities opened in Minnesota, thereby increasing the 
number of bank offices in the state 18 percent. And the 
bulk of these new offices were not located in metro-
politan areas, as one might expect given the home 
office protection clause. Instead, 44 percent of the new 
offices were in rural Minnesota towns, and 22 percent 
of them were in communities which previously had no 
banking offices. 
• Branching provides a wider range 
of banking services 
The evidence suggests that branching also results in 
consumers being offered a wider range of banking 
services. Weintraub and Jessup (1964) studied this 
question nationally for a number of banking services, 
including revolving credit, trust services, special check-
ing accounts, payroll services, and foreign exchange 
services. As might be expected, they found that about 
the same percentage of large branch banks and large 
unit banks offered these services and that more large 
branch banks offered them than did small unit banks. 
But they also found that for banks with less than 
$25 million in deposits, being allowed to branch did 
make a difference: the services were offered by a bigger 
share of the branch banks than the unit banks. Kohn 
(1964) made a similar study in New York State for 
selected banking services and reached a similar conclu-
sion: regardless of size, more branch banks than unit 
banks made the services available. 
What the U.S. Experience 
Means for Montana 
Is this evidence on the merits of branch banking appli-
cable to the unit banking state of Montana? Based on 
the current structure of financial institutions and mar-
kets in Montana, we think so. 
An Underbanked State 
The number of banks and the number of people in 
Montana strongly suggest that the state has an unmet 
demand for banking services. Allowing banks to 
branch, then, would likely benefit consumers in 
Montana just as it has those in other states. 
For its current population size, Montana has a 
relatively small number of banking offices. Its two 
SMSAs —Billings and Great Falls —had 11 and 9 
banks, respectively, in June 1978. Compared to other 
SMSAs with the same population size (50,000 to 
100,000), this number of banks is about the same as 
for SMSAs in other unit banking states, but only half 
as large as for SMSAs in statewide branching states 
(Table 1). Rural areas of Montana have the same 
disadvantage. Compared to South Dakota—a branch-
ing state that shares Montana's extremely low popu-
lation density — Montana has fewer banking offices per 
town for seven out of nine population categories 
(Table 2). 
An Unnecessary Concern 
Many have argued that branching would not benefit 
consumers in Montana because the state has a high 
concentration of bank deposits in two multibank 
holding companies. As of June 1979, First Bank 
System and Northwest Bancorporation together had 
22 bank affiliates which altogether held 38 percent of 
all the deposits in the state. The concern of many 
people, of course, is that if branching were allowed, 
these two organizations, starting with an already high 
level of concentration, would grow and reduce compe-
tition substantially more. 
Some growth by these organizations might be 
expected if Montana allowed branching, given the 
evidence we have seen. And any potential decrease in 
bank competition is a proper matter for concern. How-
ever, we have argued that concentration is difficult to 
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good indication of the degree of competition in bank-
ing. Moreover, Montana has three features which 
minimize our concern about its banking industry. 
First, Montana has a third large banking organi-
zation: Western Bancorporation. Although today it 
holds less than 5 percent of bank deposits in the state, 
it represents a potential major competitor for First 
Bank System and Northwest Bancorporation. 
Second, even if the state had no third large firm, 
Montana's two-banking firm concentration ratio is not 
high compared to other states'. In 1978, the ratios of 
17 other states were higher. 
Third, evidence suggests that even a very high two-
bank concentration ratio does not raise banking prices 
or reduce banking services. In 1977 Dahl, Graham, 
and Rolnick examined the prices and services in 
Table 2 
Consumers of banking services in Montana 
are at a disadvantage. 
Average Number of Bank Offices 
in Montana and South Dakota 
Nonmetropolitan Communities 
in 1 978-79* 
Population Montana South Dakota 
of Community (Unit Banking) (Statewide Branching) 
Less than 500  .29  .51 
500-999  .73  1.07 
1,000-1,999  .93  1.26 
2,000-2,999  1.90  1.63 
3,000-4,999  1.82  1.67 
5,000-7,499  1.40  1.67 
7,500-9,999  1.25  4.00 
10,000-14,999  3.50  5.80 
15,000-24,999  4.33  — 
25,000 and over  6.00  7.00 
*Size of town is based on 1970 census. Number of bank 
offices is as of June 30,1 978, for banks and December 31, 
1979, for branches. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Minnesota, a state whose 48 percent two-bank concen-
tration ratio exceeds Montana's by a full 10 percentage 
points. The study found that, compared to urban banks 
in more restrictive states, banks in Minneapolis-
St. Paul charged higher prices for some services and 
lower prices for others, and they generally provided 
more services (Table 3). Few of the differences were 
statistically significant, but those that were indicated 
that bank competition was keener in Minnesota. 
Conclusion 
Given the evidence on the impact of branch banking 
Table 3 
Minnesota's high two-bank concentration 
ratio has not meant higher prices and 
fewer services. 
Prices and Services at Banks in Minneapolis-St. Paul 
and in SMSAs of States Which Prohibit Branching 
and Multibank Holding Companies! 
Based on 1973 survey by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 
Urban Banks 
Minneapolis- in More 
St. Paul Restrictive 
Banks States 
Prices (averages of prices reported) 
Interest Rates on: 
Savings deposits 





Services Charges for: 
Checking accounts (monthly) 
Nonsufficient funds checks (unit) 








Availability (% of banks offering) 
Overdraft credit 











Hours Open Weekly (averages)  40.6  34.9 * 
Number of banks in survey  5  22 
t Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West Virginia; SMSAs are 
standard metropolitan statistical areas. 
• Difference is significant at 10% level. 
Source: Dahl, Graham, and Rolnick 1977 
15 throughout most of the United States, and given the 
structure of banking in Montana, we conclude that 
allowing Montana banks the freedom to branch would 
be a boon to the customers they serve. We would 
expect the change to bring more offices and more 
conveniently located offices. We would also expect a 
wider variety of bank services to be offered throughout 
the state and especially in rural areas. 
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